This paper focuses on the experiences during the global financial crisis of the ten new eastern members of the European Union that joined the Union in 2004 or 2007. 1 They are from north to south: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria. Together we call them Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). They all came out of the financial crisis quite well within about two years. This paper investigates their fiscal sustainability and likely growth path. It tries to answer the question whether the CEE crisis countries have only exited the financial crisis or whether their economic convergence with the old members of the European Union will restart as well. Their European convergence is likely to continue, though at a somewhat lower pace than before 2008. This paper deals entirely with the purely economic side of the crisis and leaves all politics and considerations of political economy aside.
In a first section, I shall review the main features of the financial crisis. The second section reviews the resolution of the financial crisis. A third section is the focus of this paper. It investigates the outcomes: what the crisis resolution meant for competitiveness and future growth. As a means of comparison, I use the PIGS -Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain, the weakest and least developed part of the EU also in crisis.
Finally, we conclude what this might mean for future convergence of the ten new eastern members of the EU with the old members.
The main conclusion is that the three Baltic countries have undertaken very major structural changes and are likely to achieve among the highest growth rates within the EU for the foreseeable future. But also the other CEE countries have carried out sensible changes and are likely to see their economic convergence with the EU to continue.
Since our interest in this paper is the effects of policy, not the impact on the economy as a whole, all averages are unweighted. The statistics used are primarily from
Eurostat and the IMF World Economic Outlook databases.
The Nature of the Financial Crisis in Central and Eastern Europe
The East European financial crisis of 2008-9 was a standard credit-boom-and-bust cycle leading to a current account crisis quite similar to the East Asian crisis of 1997/8. It was overheating arising from excessive success. Large private capital inflows had mounted to too much credit and private debt. The pace of their expansion had been dangerously rapid, and increasingly the capital inflows consisted of short-term bank loans, which were increasingly spent on consumption and real estate investment, but investment was also high. Wages and real estate prices skyrocketed, rendering these countries ever less competitive, which further undermined their current account balance. Output plunged and unemployment soared. from a large fiscal deficit or excessive public debt at the outset, and they had no conspicuous systemic flaws (Darvas and Pisani-Ferry, 2008 Hungary, Latvia and Romania, but we consider also Estonia, Lithuania and Bulgaria crisis countries, since they required substantial fiscal adjustments.
The four countries that had fixed exchange rates (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) had no means to sterilize the large capital inflows, as they were caught in the "impossible trinity:" With fixed exchange rates and free capital flows, they could not pursue independent monetary policy. If they were to raise their domestic interest rates, they would only attract larger capital inflows (Oxelheim 1980) . They had hardly any bonds. Their only policy tools were fiscal policy, tax policy and bank regulation, which could and should have been used more, but few did so during the boom. Bulgaria did try to tighten monetary regulation before the crisis, but lending escaped abroad (IMF, forthcoming). Of the countries with fixed exchange rates Lithuania and Latvia had almost balanced budgets, while Estonia and Bulgaria maintained steady budget surpluses, which explained why they could manage without IMF programs.
The crucial cause of these sharp output falls was a "sudden stop" as capital inflows that stopped and were reversed. (Bakker and Gulde, 2010, p. 22) . Naturally, the high euro exchange rate in the midst of the crisis was bad for the eurozone and countries with euro pegs, but the damage was comparatively limited.
The US Fed provided many emerging and developed economies with credit swaps (Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor 2008 countries with freely-floating exchange rates, although this endangered the banking system in the eurozone.
Crisis Resolution
The great positive surprise was that after two years, the crisis in the region had abated and all countries returned to economic growth thanks to decisive and successful crisis resolution. As these were forceful and radical they are well worth studying. Among the six crisis countries, the most radical cures were carried out by the Baltic countries, on which we shall focus, since they offer the starkest case studies, though also Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania undertook radical changes. Their cures have several characteristic features, although they were not shared by all.
As the width of the financial disaster was becoming evident, the first question was whether international financial assistance was needed or not. In spite of the tremendous economic shocks and prior imbalances, only Hungary, Latvia, and Romania required IMF Moreover, devaluation would have boosted inflation, as many prices are internationally set.
Instead, they pursued "internal devaluation," cutting wages and public expenditures, which rendered their cost levels competitive and allowed them to turn their large current account deficits swiftly into substantial surpluses. A corollary is that depreciation is a much over-advertised cure in current macroeconomic discourse.
Regardless of exchange rate policy, monetary policy and bank regulation, no small open economy can safeguard itself against sudden capital inflows and outflows. In fact, no country changed exchange rate policy, suggesting that exchange rate policy might be less essential than commonly thought.
Especially the three Baltic countries, but also Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, undertook very radical fiscal adjustments in early 2009. They were remarkable in three regards: they were radical, they were highly front-loaded, and they consisted to threequarters of expenditure cuts rather than revenue measures. If policies had not changed, the IMF assessed that in 2009 Latvia would have reached budget deficits of 18 percent of GDP, Lithuania 16 percent and Estonia more than 10 percent of GDP. Therefore, these countries undertook in that very year gross fiscal adjustments of 13.9 percent of GDP in Latvia, 8.8 percent of GDP in Estonia, and 8.0 percent of GDP in Lithuania (Purfield and Rosenberg, 2010, pp. 17-18) .
Large cuts in public expenditure facilitated beneficial structural reforms. The most popular reforms were cuts in the state apparatus. All did that, but Latvia went the furthest, cutting the number of state agencies by half, the number of public servants by 30 percent, and the average public wage by 26 percent, while prohibiting double earnings by public servants. The ministers set an example by accepting salary cuts of 35 percent (Åslund and Dombrovskis, 2011) . Lithuania cut wages by 20 percent.
A hard and unpopular measure was to cut wages throughout the economy. In general, private sector wages cuts were smaller than in the public sector. By the end of 2009, average earnings had fallen from the peak by 11 percent in Latvia, 9 percent in Lithuania and 6.5 percent in Estonia (Purfield and Rosenberg, 2010, p. 24) .
Social benefit expenditures had risen excessively throughout the region during the boom years 2005-8. Now, the governments had little choice but to trim sickness, disability, maternity and pension benefits, often in a progressive fashion to safeguard the most vulnerable. At the same time, eligibility requirements were tightened. Education and health care reforms are proceeding, but more gradually. Financing is being tied to output and quality rather than to institutions and moved from real estate to qualified professional services. In health care, financing is transferred from hospitals to primary care. Latvia has closed down many schools with too few students. Lithuania has launched a substantial higher education reform, tying state financing to students, so that institutions of higher education are competing to attract the best students and have obtained incentives both to economize on resources and to raise quality.
Most of the CEE countries have reasonable business environments, but virtually all of them undertook substantial reform to improve it further during the financial crisis. Based on these criteria, we can claim that CEE with the exception of Hungary has overcome the macroeconomic crisis. They have sound economic growth, although much lower than before the crisis. Current account is reasonably close to balance. Budget deficits are moderate and set to fall further. Only Hungary has a public debt that exceeds the Maastricht limit of 60 percent of GDP, while most CEE countries have public debts of about 40 percent of GDP. The only really worrisome feature is that public expenditure has risen far too high. In Central Europe and the Baltics, public expenditure as a share of GDP has risen to 45-46 percent, and it needs to be brought down to about 35 percent of GDP to allow for sound economic growth (Sachs and Warner 1996, Tanzi and Schuknecht 2000) . Fortunately, most CEE governments have such ambitions.
Our second query is whether conditions have been created for high future economic growth. By and large, the CEE countries had already advanced further in structural reforms than other countries at their level of economic development, which was a reason for their fast economic growth (excepting only Hungary because of too large public debt and still the highest public expenditures).
A first measurement of structural reform is ranking on the World Bank ease of doing business index. Among the CEE countries, Latvia has taken the lead, advancing to no. 21 among 183 countries, while Estonia ranks no. 24 and Lithuania no. 27. Since
Latvia and Lithuania rank about no 50 in the world in terms of GDP per capita in purchasing power parities, this indicates substantial capacity of further growth. Romania is doing the worst, ranking no. 72, but Italy ranks no. 87 and Greece no. 100 (figure 6).
Typical recent reform measures have been to make it simpler to register property, to resolve insolvency, to pay taxes, to start a business and to enforce a contract.
As a consequence of improving business conditions, corruption is abating. Naturally, this means greatly improved competitiveness of these countries.
The real effective exchange rate (REER, deflated with unit labor cost) offers quite a revealing composite picture. The overall message is that nominal or internal devaluation can work, but labor costs must be checked either way. The differences from This result is surprising and it leads to one major conclusion: Depreciation is neither necessary nor beneficial for the kickstart of exports contrary to conventional wisdom. Paradoxically, the country with the largest real effective exchange rate declinePoland, experienced the smallest export expansion.
A priori, this conclusion appears illogical. Depreciation should reduce export prices, and with normal price elasticity exports should increase. Such reasoning, however, would be incomplete. The actual choice was not between depreciation and stable real exchange rate, but between nominal or internal devaluation. As we have discussed above, the countries with fixed exchange rates undertook far greater structural adjustments than those with floating exchange rates. Nominal devaluation salvaged
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic from, the need to undertake more radical structural reforms.
Similarly, Slovakia and Slovenia, which enjoyed ample liquidity thanks to being members of the Economic and Monetary Union, did not face the same pressure to carry out major structural reforms and wage cuts as the countries with currency boards that had to defend their fixed exchange rates with little access to liquidity. This reasoning boils down to Janos Kornai's (1980) old argument about the impact of hard budget constraints.
Export expansion was proportionate to the contraction of domestic demand, which was the greatest in the Baltic countries and Bulgaria.
The countries that have reached the highest export growth and GDP growth are Estonia and Lithuania followed by Latvia, while the three other crisis countriesRomania, Hungary and Bulgaria -have had slower recoveries. The first three have been the leaders in structural reform during the crisis which appears the most likely reason for their significantly better performance. The three latter focused more on austerity and less on structural reforms, which seems to have generated less growth. The pattern is clear.
The countries with fixed exchange rates undertook both more fiscal adjustment and structural reform, which resulted in faster export and output growth.
This does not imply that fixed exchange rates without the euro is a desirable policy. On the contrary, it was the absence of ECB liquidity that rendered the crisis so deep in the Baltic countries. The point is rather that they have exploited their profound crisis in the best possible way. With their elevated public expenditures, expenditure cuts were preferable to tax increases, and that was their choice. They did not only opt for austerity but also pursued structural reforms on a broad front, and they are already paying off. The sad observation is that major fiscal adjustments and reforms rarely occur without being prompted by a major crisis (Drazen and Grilli, 1993) . Estonia was so determined to join the EMU, that it managed to do it already in January 2011, and Latvia and Lithuania are firmly determined to do so in 2014, while Bulgaria's EMU entry has been somewhat delayed by the crisis.
Among the CEE countries, a clear pattern is present. The biggest countriesPoland, Romania, the Czech Republic and Hungary -have opted for floating exchange rates and inflation targeting, while the six smaller economies have adopted fixed exchange rates or the euro. Similarly, the four big countries have had larger budget deficits on average during the last decade than the six smaller ones. Clearly, we are seeing different choices depending on the size of the economy, and they seem rational.
Inflation targeting appears to have worked well in Poland and the Czech Republic, while it does not make much sense in very small and open economies, notably like the Baltics, which can hardly shield themselves from excessive capital inflow with any exchange rate and monetary policy. Since the small nations perceive more external dangers, they manage to maintain greater fiscal discipline than the more confident larger countries.
The existence of an IMF standby program does not appear important in itself.
Latvia carried out substantial reforms under an IMF program, while Hungary and Romania did much less. The explanation is that the IMF is favorable to structural reforms, but it does not necessarily demand them, whereas its conditions on fiscal and monetary policies are strict. Central and East Europeans have by and large bought the idea that it is better to cut expenditures than to raise taxes. Three-quarters of the early fiscal adjustment in the Baltics came through public expenditure cuts rather than tax hikes. Large selective cuts facilitate beneficial structural reforms. They do not only reduce the capacity of public services but also often improve the quality of public services through reforms of administration, health care and education. Alberto Alesina and Silvia Ardagna (2009) offer substantial statistical evidence for the thesis that "fiscal adjustments…based upon spending cuts and no tax increases are more likely to reduce deficits and debt over GDP ratios than those based upon tax increases. In 2011, the three Baltic countries belong to the fastest expanding economies in Europe with a likely growth of 5-6 percent. None of them suffered more than two years of output contraction. Their growth is driven by exports.
Second, the crisis has forced all countries to trim their public sectors and improve their already well-functioning economic systems, rendering them even more competitive.
The Baltics stand out for several wise choices. They acted fast with large, early adjustments. They chose to cut their elevated expenditures rather than raise taxes. They used the austerity for structural reforms on a broad scale that are likely to promote economic growth.
With regard to exchange rate regimes, our observations confirm the current state of economics. On the one hand, the role of exchange rate regime seems to be overdone.
Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff (2001, p. 373) pointed out "the exceedingly weak relationship between the exchange rate and virtually any macroeconomic aggregates."
Other policies are simply more important. On the other hand, Andrew Rose (2011, p. 663) noted: "Very small countries tend to fix," especially for countries with less than 2.5 million, which includes Estonia and Latvia, and Lithuania is only slightly larger.
Most factors point to renewed, elevated, sustainable economic growth for most of the region with the possible exception of Hungary and Slovenia that have undertaken less reform. Overall growth will be constrained by less credit expansion because of deleveraging and slow economic growth in Western Europe, the dominant export market of Central and Eastern Europe. Free market policies are not in danger, nor are democracy or social peace.
After a decade of very high economic growth, these countries encountered their first serious recession, but they took it on the chin. At the outset of the crisis it appeared as if the big issue to resolve was the exchange rate and monetary regime, but in the end no country changed exchange rate regime, suggesting that it was neither crucial nor necessary. There is no reason to suspect that these countries have got stuck in any middle-income trap (Eichengreen, Park and Shin 2011) . They have competitive economic systems and are likely to undertake sufficient investment in human and physical capital.
Before the crisis, all the CEE countries evidenced substantial economic convergence with the old EU-15, and they do so also after the crisis (figure 12). The three Baltic countries have undertaken very major structural changes and are likely to achieve among the highest growth rates within the EU for the foreseeable future. But also the other CEE countries have carried out sensible changes and are likely to see their economic convergence with the EU to continue, which is the second major conclusion of this paper.
